An employee receives a call or video call from the CEO. They recognise their face, hear their voice and receive an urgent instruction: make a confidential transfer to a specified account.
The problem emerges later, when the company discovers that it never spoke to the real executive. The voice or image had been generated or manipulated using artificial intelligence.
If your company has suffered CEO deepfake fraud in Barcelona and the money has already been transferred, we must act immediately. Contacting the bank, preserving the evidence and reporting it as soon as possible can increase the chances of tracing and freezing the funds.
At Barcelona Penal, we are criminal lawyers specialising in fraud, cybercrime and economic crime in Barcelona. We assess this type of fraud from the outset and coordinate the criminal and evidential strategy to protect the interests of the affected company.
Key summary: what to do in the event of CEO deepfake fraud in Barcelona
- Contact the bank immediately and inform it that the transfer was made as a result of fraud.
- Request that it attempts to stop, recover or freeze the transaction and urgently contacts the receiving institution.
- Do not delete emails, messages, recordings, call logs or any information related to the transfer.
- File a report as soon as possible, providing the bank details and available evidence.
- There is no legal deadline of “24 or 72 hours” to report the crime, but speed is essential because the money can be moved between several accounts in a short time.
- If the employee themselves authorised the transfer after being deceived, we should not automatically assume it is an “unauthorised” banking transaction.
- Deception through a false CEO identity may constitute fraud and, depending on how it was carried out, other offences may also apply.
- If the amount exceeds certain thresholds or other circumstances are present, the fraud may be aggravated.
What is CEO deepfake fraud?
CEO fraud involves impersonating an executive to persuade a person with payment authority to make a transfer.
INCIBE has warned about CEO fraud for years: criminals first study the organisation, identify who can authorise payments and who can execute them, and create a credible communication to trigger the transfer.
Artificial intelligence has considerably increased the sophistication of this deception.
It is no longer just about a fake email
Traditional fraud could involve receiving an email that appeared to have been sent by the CEO.
It can now involve:
- Voice cloning.
- Manipulated video calls.
- Artificially generated videos.
- Fake WhatsApp or Teams messages.
- Compromised corporate emails.
- Combinations of several techniques.
The aim remains the same: to convince the victim that they are acting on a genuine instruction.
Why the deception works
Attackers usually combine three elements:
authority + urgency + confidentiality.
For example:
“We are finalising an acquisition. It is confidential. I need you to transfer €84,000 today and do not discuss it with anyone yet.”
The victim does not merely receive an instruction. They receive a story designed to prevent them from following the usual verification procedures.
What to do if the transfer has already been made
When we discover CEO deepfake fraud in Barcelona, the first priority is to try to prevent the funds from continuing to move.
1. Contact the bank immediately
We must inform the institution that the transfer was made as a result of fraud and ask it to activate its internal fraud procedures.
We should provide, at a minimum:
- Amount transferred.
- Date and time.
- Destination IBAN.
- Transaction reference.
- Name of the stated beneficiary.
- Explanation of the fraud.
We should also ask our institution to contact the receiving bank urgently in an attempt to trace the funds.
Can a transfer be cancelled?
We should not assume that an executed transfer can simply be cancelled.
The Bank of Spain reminds us that transfers are generally irrevocable once the institution has received the payment order.
This does not mean that no action should be taken. The bank may try to arrange the recovery of the funds and contact the receiving institution, but the outcome will depend on whether the money remains available, how the transaction was carried out and the cooperation of the institutions involved.
2. Preserve all evidence
We must not delete anything.
We should retain:
- Emails.
- WhatsApp, Teams, Slack or other platform messages.
- Call or video call data.
- Recordings, where lawfully available.
- Audio or video files received.
- Screenshots.
- Bank details provided by the attackers.
- Transfer confirmations.
- Logs of access to corporate accounts.
Where relevant technical information exists, it may be advisable for a digital forensic expert to preserve and analyse the digital evidence.
3. Report it as soon as possible
There is no general rule stating that we have exactly 24 or 72 hours to report this crime.
However, in practice, every hour can matter.
Accounts used to receive fraudulent money may only be active for very short periods. The funds can quickly be transferred to other accounts, converted into cryptoassets or sent to other countries.
If your company has suffered CEO deepfake fraud and the transfer has already been made, every hour counts. Contact our criminal lawyers now to activate urgent legal measures and maximise the chances of recovering the money.
Where to report CEO fraud in Barcelona
We can report the facts to the law enforcement authorities or the competent court.
In Barcelona, the following may become involved, among others:
- Mossos d'Esquadra.
- National Police.
- Civil Guard.
- The duty court or competent Investigating Court.
It is not necessary to know the identity of the criminals before filing a report.
Indeed, part of the investigation will involve tracing the receiving accounts, identifying account holders, analysing communications, obtaining banking information and reconstructing the route of the money.
What offence is committed in CEO deepfake fraud?
It is not essential for the victim company to know the exact criminal classification before filing a report.
The key is to explain accurately what happened.
Fraud as the main offence
When criminals deceive a person into believing they are speaking to a real executive and persuade them to voluntarily order a transfer, this may constitute the offence of Fraud.
The Spanish Criminal Code regulates fraud in Article 248: it arises where, for profit, sufficient deception is used to cause another person to carry out an act of disposal of assets that causes them harm.
This explanation is particularly suited to CEO fraud: the employee makes the transfer because they have been deceived about the identity of the person requesting it.
Is it always computer fraud?
Not necessarily.
The Criminal Code also provides for specific forms of fraud linked to computer manipulation, currently regulated in Article 249.
However, the fact that a deepfake was created using artificial intelligence does not automatically turn the case into “computer fraud”.
We must analyse exactly how the transfer took place.
If the attack deceives a person into authorising the payment themselves, the central element may be the deception suffered by that person. If the criminals directly manipulate systems or obtain a transfer without consent through computer-based means, the analysis may differ.
Is using the CEO's face an offence of identity theft?
We must also be cautious here.
Spain currently has no separate, general offence simply called “digital identity theft”.
Article 401 of the Criminal Code regulates the usurpation of civil status, but its application requires specific conditions and we cannot state that every deepfake of a person automatically constitutes this offence.
The relevant issue will be to assess what the identity was used for, for how long, and what other offences were committed through the impersonation.
What happens if the transfer exceeds €50,000?
The amount may be of considerable criminal significance.
The Criminal Code provides for an aggravated form of fraud where the value defrauded exceeds €50,000.
Other aggravating circumstances may also exist, for example because of the particular seriousness of the harm or certain features of the deception.
Therefore, when assessing CEO deepfake fraud in Barcelona, one of the first details we need to know is the total amount transferred.
Can the money be recovered?
There may be a possibility, but we cannot guarantee it.
It will depend particularly on:
| Factor | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Time elapsed | The sooner we detect the fraud, the greater the chance that the funds will still be in the first receiving account. |
| Destination | A domestic or European transfer is not the same as one sent to jurisdictions that are more difficult to investigate. |
| Subsequent movement | Criminals may quickly split or move the money. |
| Banking cooperation | The sending institution can contact the receiving institution and attempt to recover funds that are still available. |
| Judicial investigation | It may make it possible to identify accounts and account holders, and request measures regarding certain funds or assets. |
Not sure where to start after the fraud? Our team specialising in economic crime will explain step by step what to report, to whom and how to protect your company from further liability.
Is the bank obliged to return the money?
We cannot automatically answer yes.
This is one of the most sensitive aspects of CEO fraud.
An unauthorised transaction and an authorised transaction made under deception are not exactly the same
Payment services legislation considers a transaction authorised when the payer has given their consent for it to be executed.
The Bank of Spain explains that a transfer is unauthorised when it has not been consented to by the payer, for example where the order was actually given by a third party.
In CEO fraud, something different usually happens: the authorised employee voluntarily accesses online banking and orders the transfer because they have been deceived.
This may complicate the automatic application of the reimbursement rules provided for transactions that are strictly unauthorised.
Does this mean we can never make a claim against the bank?
No.
Each case must be assessed.
It may be relevant to check:
- How the transaction was authorised.
- Whether the required authentication was properly applied.
- Whether there were fraud alerts.
- Whether the institution acted in accordance with its contractual and regulatory obligations.
- How the bank responded once the fraud was reported.
However, we do not recommend promising in advance that the bank will have to refund the transfer merely because the employee was the victim of a deepfake.
What should the company do about the employee who made the transfer?
Discovering a significant financial loss may trigger an immediate reaction against the person who made the payment.
It is advisable to assess the situation calmly.
The employee may also be a victim of the deception
If they received a particularly sophisticated communication and genuinely acted in the belief that they were following a legitimate instruction, we must examine the circumstances before attributing liability to them.
Among other factors, it may be important to establish:
- What protocols the company had in place.
- Whether dual authorisation existed.
- Whether transfer limits were in place.
- What instructions the employee had received.
- Whether they deliberately ignored internal controls.
- The sophistication of the deception.
We do not recommend imposing an employment sanction automatically before the internal investigation has concluded.
Do we need to notify the AEPD of the incident?
Not necessarily.
The mere use of an image or voice obtained online does not automatically mean that the victim company has suffered a personal data breach.
However, if the fraud included unauthorised access to corporate systems or the extraction of personal information relating to employees, clients or executives, we must assess whether there may have been a security breach.
Where that breach may pose a risk to individuals, the GDPR may require notification to the Spanish Data Protection Agency.
We must therefore distinguish between two issues:
being the victim of deepfake fraud and also suffering a personal data breach.
They may occur together, but they are not the same thing.
At Barcelona Penal, we represent private prosecutions in fraud and corporate fraud cases. If you want someone to actively fight to recover what you have lost, tell us about your case and we will assess how we can help.
What happens with cyber risk insurance?
If the company has a cyber risk or fraud insurance policy, we should review it immediately.
Not all policies cover CEO fraud or social engineering.
It is advisable to look specifically for cover relating to:
- Social engineering fraud.
- Impersonation fraud.
- Transfer fraud.
- Cybercrime.
- Business Email Compromise.
In addition, the policy may require the company to notify the incident within a specified period and follow particular instructions before engaging experts, lawyers or other providers.
For this reason, we recommend notifying the insurer as soon as the fraud is detected.
How to prevent further AI-enabled CEO fraud
The best prevention is not trying to ensure that every employee can identify a perfect deepfake.
We must design procedures that work even when the deception is convincing.
Dual authorisation for significant payments
Transfers above certain amounts should require the involvement of at least two people.
Confirmation through a different channel
If an executive requests a transfer by video call, we should confirm the transaction through a pre-established channel.
We should not use the telephone number or link provided within the suspicious communication itself.
Never bypass protocol because of confidentiality
A particularly clear warning sign appears when someone says:
“Do not tell anyone because the transaction is confidential.”
Confidentiality should never be used to remove internal financial controls.
Establish an internal verification word or procedure
In certain companies, it may be useful to define verification mechanisms known to financial managers and executives.
The key is that financial authorisation should not depend solely on recognising a face or voice.
Lawyers for CEO deepfake fraud in Barcelona
Fraud involving artificial intelligence combines deception, social engineering, banking transactions and digital evidence.
From our criminal law firm in Barcelona, we analyse the transfer, review the communications used to carry out the deception and prepare the report with the available documentation.
We can also act as private prosecutor so that the company has an active role in the proceedings, propose investigative measures and claim civil liability arising from the offence where appropriate.
When funds have been sent abroad, we coordinate the strategy while considering the potential need for banking measures and international judicial cooperation.
Conclusion
CEO deepfake fraud in Barcelona can cause very significant losses within minutes, but the company should not automatically assume that the money is lost.
We must contact the bank immediately, preserve all communications, report the facts and reconstruct how the deception took place.
Artificial intelligence is making impersonation increasingly convincing. Therefore, in addition to responding correctly after the fraud, companies must implement authorisation systems that do not rely solely on recognising an executive's voice or face.
